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BETWEEN CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: LESSONS ON
SHARIA AND PLURALISM FROM NIGERIA’S KADUNA AND
KEBBI STATES
Eyene Okpanachi∗
INTRODUCTION
The revitalized implementation of Sharia law and its expansion from the
personal to criminal aspects in twelve northern states in the wake of Nigeria’s
return to democratic rule in 1999 represents one of the most turbulent cases of
intergroup relations in the contemporary history of Nigeria.1 The development
was set in motion by the formal adoption of stringent Sharia codes by Ahmed
Sani, the governor of Zamfara State, on October 27, 1999, and thereafter by
eleven other northern states—Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano,
Jigawa, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, and Borno.2 In reintroducing Sharia into the
domains of criminal justice, these states evoked the “somewhat ambiguous
clause [in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution] that empowered a state
assembly . . . to confer additional jurisdiction on the Sharia Court of Appeal.”3
A key consequence of this development was an increase in the politics of
identity both in relation to the re-introduction of Sharia and the reactions to it.
Extant discourses on Sharia by Western scholars tend to oversimplify a
complex issue.4 One such oversimplification is the depiction of Sharia as a
unified, monolithic project. For instance, in a 2002 report entitled The
Talibanization of Nigeria: Sharia Law and Religious Freedom, Paul Marshall
details ways in which Sharia violates human rights and religious freedom,

∗ Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching/Research Assistant, Department of Political Science,
University of Alberta, Canada.
1 ROTIMI SUBERU, FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NIGERIA 135–37 (2001).
2 Philip Ostien, Preface to Volumes I–V of SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 1996–
2006: A SOURCEBOOK, at vii–viii, x–xi (Philip Ostein ed., 2007). These states argued that the implementation
of “full Sharia” is the restitution of the right to do so, which was aborted with the commencement of British
colonial rule in 1900. Id. at ix.
3 Rotimi Suberu, Religion and Institutions: Federalism and the Management of Conflicts over Sharia in
Nigeria, 21 J. INT’L DEV. 547, 551 (2009).
4 Jan Michiel Otto, Preface to SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 11, 11–15 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010)
[hereinafter SHARIA INCORPORATED].
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especially the rights of non-Muslims in the Sharia-implementing states.5 The
report concludes that, with the introduction of Sharia, Nigeria could slide into
lawlessness and terror, like Afghanistan under the Taliban.6 Yet this report,
written ostensibly to protect the U.S. national interest, not only denies nonMuslims agency, but also sees the issue of power in the Sharia question as a
zero-sum game without giving adequate reference to the multiple sites of
power and the contestation that this dispersion of power between both Muslim
and non-Muslim groups can provoke.
Keeping in mind the understanding of power as an ongoing process, as a
way in which certain actions modify others, and as an intermediary between
freedom and domination,7 this Essay uses the comparative case studies of
Kaduna and Kebbi States to contribute to an understanding of the Sharia issue
in Nigeria and to uncover the conflict and compromise involved. The argument
herein is that by contextualizing the issue and placing it in its historical
specificity we can better capture the ebbs, flows, and complex nuances
involved in the Sharia debate, especially the “divergent perspectives,
strategies, and practices regarding Sharia implementation [that] have
developed from state to state in the Muslim north,” and which have thereby
helped “to quarantine the Sharia issue at the level of each state.”8
Utilizing documentary sources and interviews carried out in Kaduna and
Kebbi States between 2008 and 2009,9 this Essay asks the following questions:
what forms of discord or compromise emerged over the Sharia policy and what
were the implications of these transformations on the dynamics of these states?
What is the nature of the citizenship, identity contestations, and conflicts that
have ensued over the Sharia policy in these states and how have they been
5

PAUL MARSHALL, CTR.

FOR

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE TALIBANIZATION

AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 62–66 (2002).
6 Id. at 8. Several years later, it would

OF

NIGERIA: SHARIA LAW

appear that this conclusion was hasty and not well-tempered, and
that rather than the “Talibanization of Nigeria,” the Nigerian Sharia, despite of the challenges it poses to
intergroup relationships, could in fact serve as a model for moderation in Sharia in Afghanistan. Yet,
moderation in Sharia in Nigeria did not come from the adoption of a foreign policy by the United States “to
deal with the spreading jurisdiction of sharia law in Nigeria” as Paul Marshall recommends, but rather from
social and political dynamics within Nigeria. Id. at 13.
7 This insight is drawn from Michel Foucault, who characterizes power as “multiplicity of force
relations” eliciting a whole field of responses, reactions, and possible interventions, instead of limiting the
conception of power to a homogenous or unilateral construct depicting domination. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1
THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 121 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978); Michel Foucault, The
Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777–95 (1982).
8 Rotimi Suberu, The Nigerian Federal System: Performance, Problems and Prospects, 28 J. CONTEMP.
AFR. STUD. 459, 463 (2010).
9 Fieldwork was supported by the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria).
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managed or mismanaged? What are the mechanisms instituted or utilized to
accommodate differences arising over the implementation of Sharia in these
two states, and how does Sharia in these two states interface with the secular
state? An analysis of these issues will help us to dispel crude generalizations
and totalizing narratives over the Sharia question.
This Essay is structured10 as follows: Part I provides a rationale for the
choice of Kaduna and Kebbi States as comparative cases for this Essay. Part II
highlights some issues in the implementation of Sharia in the two states. This
is followed by subsequent Parts that examine and provide reasons for
similarities and variations in implementation in the two cases, highlighting the
contestations, the modes of accommodation utilized, and the inter- and intragroup politics and power relations over the Sharia issue.
I. CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON OF KADUNA AND KEBBI STATES
There are good reasons for the choice of Kaduna and Kebbi States as case
studies. Both states fall within the northwestern geopolitical zone of Nigeria,
which is the core of the former Sokoto Caliphate, an Islamic state and
government that existed before the colonial period. However, these two states
also have a significant number of non-Muslim indigenous ethnic groups, which
are in fact the majority in some local government areas11 and which have
always fought and resisted Hausa-Fulani12 overlordship and Islamization.
These groups are located in areas that include southern Kaduna in Kaduna

10 Due to lack of space, this Essay takes for granted the history of Sharia in Nigeria because this is dealt
with by some of the contributors to this Symposium.
11 ONIGU OTITE, ETHNIC PLURALISM AND ETHNICITY IN NIGERIA 52–53 (1990).
12 The Hausa-Fulani are Nigeria’s most populous ethnic group, accounting for about twenty-nine percent
of Nigeria’s population. JOHN PADEN, FAITH AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA: NIGERIA AS A PIVOTAL STATE IN THE
MUSLIM WORLD 6–7, 39–40 (2008). They are spread all over the north of the country, but are concentrated
more in the western part of the north. Hausa-Fulani is a fusion of the Hausa and Fulani people. Though
historically the Hausa-Fulani are two distinct groups, they are increasingly seen as the same in Nigeria. The
Hausa consists of a collection of West African peoples that was integrated through immigration and conquest
into the indigenous populations that inhabit what is now called Hausaland while the Fulani are a nomadic
pastoralist group that came to Hausaland from the Senegal River valley in the thirteenth century. A key
watershed in the integration of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups and the emergence of their “shared” identity in
Nigeria was the jihad that began in 1804 under the leadership of the Fulani scholar, Usman dan Fodio, against
what he considered the practice of a lax form of Islam in Hausaland. The jihad led to the conquest of the Hausa
states, the establishment of the Fulani theocratic system under the Sokoto Caliphate in most of the Hausa
states, and large-scale conversion of Hausa (as well as Fulani) people to Islam. Also in the ensuing
relationship, the Fulani settled more among the Hausa people, intermarried with them, and adopted the Hausa
language.
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State and Zuru13 in Kebbi State. In southern Kaduna, historian Toure KazahToure observed that “with the imposition of British colonialism, there was a
transformation in ethnic relations . . . Colonial policies—and indeed British
pragmatism—with a racist ideology, absorbed the dominant old ruling circles
of the Hausa-Fulani emirates into the system, while excluding the other ethnic
groups in the zone.”14 There were similar experiences in Kebbi State.
Yet, despite these similarities, there are compelling differences between the
two states. First, there is a huge difference in the population of the states and
the percentage of Muslims and non-Muslims. While it is estimated that
Muslims in Kebbi State make up eighty-four percent of the state’s current
population, the Muslims are estimated to be fifty-six percent of Kaduna State’s
population. This means that non-Muslims in Kebbi State constitute sixteen
percent of the population while non-Muslims in Kaduna State constitute fortyfour percent of the population.15 Secondly, Kebbi is a new state created in 1991
that served during the precolonial period as the twin headquarters of the
Sokoto Caliphate. In contrast, Kaduna is an old state established in 1976,
whose capital, Kaduna, was the capital of the former northern region and later
the capital of the former north-central state. Given this character, the two states
differ with respect to the nature of their ethno-religious diversity, with Kaduna
being the more heterogeneous and cosmopolitan state, where the state’s HausaFulani and southern Kaduna communities, as well as migrants from all over
Nigeria, are heavily represented, especially in Kaduna.16 Thirdly, unlike Kebbi
State, which has been relatively peaceful, Kaduna State has had a history of
violent ethno-religious conflict and a radicalized civil society. Such conflict
has often “pitted the state’s Muslim Hausa-Fulani politicoeconomic power
group, which is based mainly in the northern portions of the state, against a
constellation of non-Muslim southern Kaduna minority tribes.”17 Grasping

13 Zuru is one of the four emirates in Kebbi State. Kebbi State, NIGERIA NAT’L, http://www.
nigerianational.com/-states/109-kebbi-state (last visited Sept. 14, 2011). Geographically, it is embedded in the
heart of the Muhammadan Emirates. See generally S.J. HOGBEN, THE MUHAMMADAN EMIRATES OF NIGERIA
(1930).
14 Toure Kazah-Toure, The Political Economy of Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Southern Kaduna,
Nigeria: [De]constructing a Contested Terrain, 24 AFR. DEV. 109, 139 (1999).
15 See Some Demographic Data: Nigeria’s Sharia States, in Ostien, supra note 2, at xix.
16 Kaduna, according to the 2006 national census, has a population of 1,563,300, and it is the fourth-most
populous city in Nigeria. Troy Lloyd-Jones, Analysis of Economic Development in Kaduna State and City
(Univ. of Westminster, Working Paper No. 170211, 2011), available at http://www.westminster.ac.uk/_data/
assets/pdf_file/0007/81169/Working-Paper-Economic-development-in-Kaduna-State-and-City-170211V3.pdf.
17 Rotimi Suberu, Nigeria: Dilemmas of Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGES 327,
337 (Ugo M. Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004).
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these differences will help observers come to terms with the pattern of
diversity and the contexts that characterize or condition the manifestation of
conflict and the management strategies employed.
A. Sharia in Kaduna State
The Kaduna Sharia question started on December 14, 1999, when the
Kaduna State Assembly constituted an eleven-person, all-Muslim committee to
collate views of the people on the need to introduce the Sharia legal system in
the state.18 This single action created division in the House of Assembly along
religious lines. The Christian members of the House of Assembly argued that
the motion was not properly passed and accused the Muslim members of
having a hidden agenda. The Muslims, in turn, argued that Sharia is purely a
Muslim affair that had nothing to do with Christians. The Muslims also
maintained that, in any case, the two Christian members nominated to
participate in the committee declined their nominations.19
As Hussaini Abdu and Lydia Umar documented, given the controversy
over the constitution and membership of the legislative committee, which
heightened the suspicions of a hidden agenda to “Islamize Kaduna State,” the
Christian community refused to appear before the committee, while Muslims
from various local governments in Kaduna State trooped to the House of
Assembly to present their memoranda and express solidarity with the
legislators. At the same time, both Muslims and Christians organized rallies
and lectures to educate their adherents on their differing positions on Sharia.
While this was occurring, the Kaduna State government formed two
interreligious committees consisting of equal numbers of Muslim and Christian
leaders in an attempt to ease the political tension.20
After the legislative committee of the State House of Assembly rounded off
the public hearing, the Christian Association of Nigeria (“CAN”) Kaduna State
branch organized a public protest on February 21, 2000, against what they
called the “planned introduction of Sharia in the state.”21 The peaceful protest
later turned violent: Muslim youths clashed with the Christian protesters, and
fighting between Christians and Muslims spiraled out of control, spilling over

18

Hussaini Abdu & Lydia Umar, Ethnic and Religious Crisis in Kaduna, in HOPE BETRAYED: A REPORT
88 (2002).

ON IMPUNITY AND STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 83,
19 Id.
20
21

Id. at 89.
Id.
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to outlying local government areas (“LGAs”), with massive violence and
destruction on both sides. Another incident of violence soon followed in May
2000, while the Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up to probe February’s
clashes had yet to complete its work. It took the intervention of armed soldiers
before tentative peace was restored to the city.
B. Sharia in Kebbi
The Governor of Kebbi, Alhaji Muhammad Adamu Aliero, in October
1999, formed the Committee on the Implementation of Sharia Law to, among
other functions, “advise the Government on how best to entrench Sharia in the
State legal system” and “identify and review relevant State laws, so as to bring
them in conformity with the Sharia legal system.”22 Having received the report
of the Committee, and the White Paper Drafting Committee, the Kebbi State
government issued a White Paper in June 2000, and formally launched Sharia
in December 2000. At the launch of the Sharia legal code at the Haliru Abdu
stadium in Birnin Kebbi, the state capital, Governor Mohammed Adamu
Aliero defended Sharia and underscored its democratic legitimacy.
Under the re-established Sharia law, the state’s Sharia and Upper Sharia
Courts were newly established with the competence to apply the full range of
Islamic law, including civil law (ranging from marriage to land law) and
criminal law (ranging from homicide to apostasy) on Muslims and nonMuslims who opt to subject themselves to the Sharia law.23 Appeals from the
Sharia Courts in all matters have been directed to the state Sharia Courts of
Appeal. A vital piece of legislation in this regard was the Executive Bill
presented by the Kebbi State government to the state House of Assembly to
confer additional jurisdiction to the Sharia Court of Appeal of the state to cover
civil and criminal matters in all aspects of Sharia in accordance with the
provisions of Section 277 of the 1999 Constitution. The government also
accepted the Sharia Committee’s recommendation that a Sharia Court should
be established in each district of the state and in such other places where it is
necessary, while an Upper Sharia Court should be established in each local
government headquarters, with powers to make judgments on all capital
offenses.24 In addition, a wide range of other legislation was directed at the
prohibition of particular “social vices” and “un-Islamic behaviour” such as
22 White Paper on the Report of the Committee on the Implementation of Sharia in Kebbi State, in
SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, supra note 2, at 177 [hereinafter White Paper].
23 See id. at 178–79.
24 Id. at 179.
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traditional boxing (dambe), gambling, prostitution, unedifying media, and
excessive mixing together of unrelated males and females.25 The
implementation of Sharia provoked apprehension and opposition from nonMuslims in Kebbi State. In December 2000, Christians in the state petitioned
Nigeria’s Senate over plans by Governor Adamu Aliero to introduce Sharia
law in the state.26
II. A COMPARISON OF SHARIA IN KADUNA AND KEBBI STATES
In both states, Sharia redefined perceptions of ethno-religious identity and
interests and increased rhetorical discourses involving the interpretation and reinterpretation of events and history. In both states, there were also similarities
in the recourse to cultural registers of groups’ history, collective memory,
symbols, and myths. This is consistent with the literature on identity. As
political scientist Crawford Young stated in his penetrating analysis of the
politics of cultural pluralism, “Historical parameters defined the bounds of
subsequent crystallization of social identities. But the basic units of
contemporary cultural conflict, themselves fluid and shifting, are often entirely
novel entities, in other instances substantially altered and transformed, in most
cases redefined versions of cultural groups.”27
While it posed new challenges, the expansion of Sharia in the two states
brought to the fore extant issues in the National Question,28 especially
concerning majority-minority relations. Some of these issues include
representation, fair distribution, and religious freedom. Fear of Sharia by nonMuslims in both states emanated, largely, from the perception that their full
citizenship rights would further be denied them as a result of Sharia. Sharia
therefore provided the opportunity for these groups to mobilize and draw
attention to their predicament as minority groups. As political scientist Georges
Nzongola-Ntalaja noted, while it has often been portrayed as religious hostility
between Christians and Muslims, these confrontations are surface
manifestations of issues relating to “the full exercise of citizenship and its

25

Id. at 184–85.
Nigeria: Christians Petition Senate over Sharia, IRIN GLOBAL (Jan. 4, 2000), http://www.irinnews.
org/report.aspx?reportid=11510.
27 CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM 34 (1979).
28 Generally, the National Question in Nigeria refers to the challenges of peaceful coexistence between
the country’s diverse ethnic groups. See Abdul Raufu Mustapha, The National Question and Radical Politics
in Nigeria, 37 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 81, 82–83 (1986).
26
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implications for contemporary economic and political life” between these
groups.29
The history of state formation through the precolonial to the colonial
period, and the administration and politics of the state in the present era
entrenched a particular form of politics that has provoked subnationalism and a
cultural context of hostility and hatred against the Hausa-Fulani especially in
Kebbi and Kaduna States.30 Given the long history of hostility as well as
unease and mutual suspicion between the non-Muslim ethnic groups and
Hausa-Fulani Muslims, the non-Muslims based their opposition to Sharia not
only on their conviction that Islamic values would be imposed more rigorously
on their everyday lives, but also on their belief that their suffering in the states
would be intensified in light of their already extant marginalization. In Kebbi
State, the non-Muslims complain of marginalization in government political
appointments, employment and promotion in the civil service, economic
marginalization (especially the control of the local market in Zuru by the
Hausa-Fulani) the imposition of the Islamic emirate system on the indigenous
chieftaincy system in Zuru, and conscripted space for Christian evangelism, a
point underscored by the inability of Christians to get land to build churches.31
In Kaduna State, non-Muslims have also complained of neglect and
marginalization, particularly in the execution of projects and appointments;
incorporation of some of the non-Muslim populations into the emirate system
and their cultural, economic, and political domination by the Hausa-Fulani
power group; preferential treatment given to traditional rulers of the Islamic
emirates over those of non-Muslim communities; and their exclusion from the
governorship of the state since its creation in 1976.32
In both states, mobilization against Sharia culminated in street protests,
particularly in Kaduna and Zuru. As a result of the protests, administrators in
both states became more conscious of and responsive to the challenges of
diversity and the need to avoid zero-sum exclusionary politics with regard to
Sharia. Specifically, responding to the above challenges, administrators in both
states demonstrated political dexterity by crafting out some pluralistic

29 George Nzongola-Ntalaja, Citizenship, Political Violence, and Democratization in Africa, 10 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 403, 407 (2004).
30 Id.
31 According to some Christian religious leaders interviewed in Zuru, such intolerance to Christianity
was reflected in the stoppage of a film on Jesus in November 2000, a month into the formal adoption of Sharia
in Kebbi State.
32 Interview with Father Matthew Kukah in Kakuri, Kaduna State (July 29, 2009).
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frameworks that assuaged the fears of the non-Muslim groups. This led to the
carving out of “Sharia-free zones” in both states—parts of Zuru in Kebbi State,
and parts of Kaduna as well as southern Kaduna communities. Thus, while
under Sharia, “religious leaders, and more generally religious thinking, have
increasing influence over politics,”33 the perceptions, actions, and techniques
of state governors and legislators were also central factors in stoking or
managing the outbreak of Sharia-related conflict or violence in both states.
As in the other ten “Sharia-compliant states,” in both Kaduna and Kebbi
States there has been an increasing tendency to “shift focus away from the
criminal law aspects of Shari’a law to its tenets of social justice and charity for
the poor.”34 In explaining this trend, political scientist Rotimi Suberu has
alluded to the “features of Nigeria’s evolving federalism” that have diffused
the “Sharia bomb” rather than allowing the “bomb” to extinguish Nigeria or
derail its Fourth Republic.35 Suberu further argues that these features “hold
considerable promise for the continued mediation and sublimation of” the
Sharia issue.36 They include the implementation of Sharia reforms within,
rather than outside, the framework of a liberal consititutional democratic
system; the decentralization of Sharia implementation through the Nigerian
federal framework; the principle of inter-segmental accomodation and national
integation as encapsulated in the federal character doctrine; judicial review and
surveillance of Sharia by Sharia appellate courts, which have overturned some
of the more draconian sentences emanating from lower Islamic courts; and the
fact that the Sharia controversy has been partially mediated by its assimilation
into the wider, ongoing debate about constitutional reform in Nigeria.37
Another key reason why the emphasis on the criminal law aspect of Sharia
has dwindled is what Father Matthew Kukah has decribed as the “sufficient
safety mechanisms” within the Sharia legal system.38 One such safety net is the
provision in the Sharia criminal codes that stipulates that no judgments on
offenses falling under hudud and qisas “can be executed unless and until the
33

INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN NIGERIA: BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT 9 (2010).
One example is alms to the poor (zakat). BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, NIGERIA INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2004), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35376.htm; see also Richard Joseph & Darren Kew, Nigeria Confronts Obasanjo’s
Legacy, 107 CURRENT HIST. 167 (2008).
35 Suberu, supra note 3, at 558.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 MATTHEW KUKAH, HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE, PONTIFICAL MISSION SOCIETY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NIGERIA: HOPES AND HINDRANCES 27 (2003)..
34
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state governor expressly consents.”39 As a consequence, while the Sharia
courts have passed judgments for criminal cases in both states with harsher
punishments ranging from hand amputation to stoning,40 these have not been
executed because the governors have not consented to the judgment by the
Sharia courts. Given that the governors of the Sharia-implementing states
harbored political ambitions for federal offices, they have, to portray
themselves not as fundamentalists incapable of holding national offices, “been
induced to tone down their advocacy of Sharia and emphasize its moderate
rather than punitive elements.”41 The fact that most of the governors that
implemented Sharia in northern Nigeria became senators is a testimony to this
fact; this includes the governors of Zamfara State, where Sharia was first
implemented, and Kaduna and Kebbi States.
There were also divergent intra-group views expressed in relation to the
Sharia debate. Underlying the unified positions on Sharia that are often
projected are the different and sometimes conflicting viewpoints and multiple
interpretations that reflect the politics of hyphenation characteristic of
fragmentation within identity groups. This contradictory group identity
construction and projection is poignantly reflected in the perception of
Muslims in the two states. To start with, while many Muslims showed support
for the proposed reintroduction of Sharia in Kaduna State, the radical Shia
cleric and leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (“IMN”), Sheikh Ibrahim
el-ZakZaky, had expressed reservation on the implementation of Sharia. He
argued that what was being implemented cannot be “full” Sharia because it
was introduced by politicians42 and also because Nigeria is not a Muslim state.
Also, with the implementation of Kaduna State’s modified version of Sharia,
some Muslims, especially prominent members of the Supreme Council for
Sharia in Nigeria (“SCSN”), a group that tries to coordinate Sharia laws across
the twelve Sharia-implementing states43 and that has hitherto been at the
vanguard of moves by Muslim civil society in Kaduna State to implement
39 Philip Ostien & Albert Dekker, Sharia and National Law in Nigeria, in SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra
note 4, at 553, 590–92 (2010).
40 AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2003: NIGERIA AI INDEX: POL 10/003/2003
(2003), available at http://www.africanreview.org/forum/docs/ai/nigeria.pdf.
41 Joseph & Kew, supra note 34, at 172. As Ostien and Dekker noted, however, this has led to the
unfortunate situation where those who have been sentenced to capital punishment, but have their sentences
deferred as a result of the refusal of the governors to consent to the executions, being left “indefinitely in
prison waiting (often for years, for small offences) for someone to do something about them.” Ostien &
Dekker, supra note 39, at 593.
42 See Nigeria Falls Apart Again?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2000, at 18.
43 PADEN, supra note 12, at 34.
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Sharia without the government, accused governor Makarfi of betraying them
by “not implementing ‘proper Sharia’ and of being more Christian than some
Christians.”44 Other Muslims believe that even though the half, rather than
“full,” implementation of Sharia was not what Muslims were looking for, it
was necessary given the multicultural nature of the state. As Umar Ibrahim, an
auto mechanic, noted, the “arrangement is only part of what is desired by
Muslims, but given the nature of the state, there is a need for compromise.”45
There are also critical voices against the implementation of Sharia from
within the Islamic community, which, even though limited and censored, have
nevertheless stimulated some debate over the rule of law, equality, and social
justice. A prominent critic is Shehu Sani, the leader of the Civil Rights
Congress, a human rights organization in Kaduna State. Shehu Sani’s stance on
Sharia not only pitted him against the state government, but also against some
Islamic groups in the state.46 For example, in his play, The Phantom Crescent,
Shehu Sani describes how politicians use Sharia “as a tool for looting the
public treasury with impunity and for stifling opposition,”47 and argues that
Sharia’s punitive provisions are applied only to the poor while the rich, who
can move with ease to other parts of the country where there is no Sharia law
to violate, are able to evade the law.48 More recently, in 2010, Shehu Sani’s
Civil Rights Congress initiated a debate on Facebook and Twitter on the
propriety of the judgment of the Sharia court in Zamfara State that sentenced
Mallam Bello Jangebe to hand amputation after he was found guilty of cow
theft.49

44 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE “MISS WORLD RIOTS”: CONTINUED IMPUNITY FOR KILLING IN KADUNA
6 (2003).
45 Arrests Follow Kaduna Clashes, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
1638674.stm.
46 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLITICAL SHARIA? HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW IN NORTHERN
NIGERIA 87 (2004).
47 Nigerian Sharia Court Bans Play, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
7033502.stm.
48 The public performance of the play was stopped by the Upper Sharia Court in Kaduna State, which
issued an injunction, preventing anyone from “selling or in any way circulating” the manuscript. See Elizabeth
Dickenson, Sharia Court Bans Satirical Play, ALLAFRICA (Oct. 28, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/
200710280013.html.
49 The Association of Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria, a pro-Sharia group in Kaduna State, instituted a
case in the Sharia court in Kaduna State against the discussion; the judge ruled in the group’s favor, arguing
that “Muslims[] had no right under the law to question or review any judgment given by the Sharia Court as
doing so would be tantamount to questioning the laws of Allah.” Ademola Bello, Who Will Save Amputees of
Sharia Law in Nigeria?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2010, 1:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
ademola-bello/who-will-save-amputees-of_b_532949.html.
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As in Kaduna State, there were also internal criticisms in Kebbi State
against the absence of a socio-economic environment conducive to the
implementation of Sharia and the use of Sharia to hoodwink the people and
pilfer the public resources. According to a Muslim cleric in Birnin Kebbi:
The Sharia in Kebbi is not being practiced correctly. Sure governor
Aliero tried his best to put in programs that will lead to the spiritual
and moral upliftment of Muslims, but he left himself and his
executive out in the process. Using Sharia as a cover, these
politicians, led by the governor, have amassed stupendous wealth,
acquiring properties here and there, including a gigantic mansion
owned by governor Aliero in Birnin Kebbi. This is contrary to the life
50
of moderation and selflessness that Sharia advocates.

The Kaduna and Kebbi State examples point to the fact that, beyond the
projection of seemingly unified identities—“Christians against Sharia” and
“Muslims in favor of Sharia”—there is a cacophony of voices that dispute
what seems to be the dominant group position. As Ismail reminds us with
regard to Islam:
[Muslims] do not engage, in a uniform manner, in the construction of
Muslim selves. Nor do they reproduce a monolithic Muslim identity.
Rather, their engagement in identity construction informs us of the
power struggles that are embedded in material local conditions and
global processes, and that make use of a multiplicity of registers and
51
frames of reference.

Despite the similarities, there are divergent political, legal, and social
responses to the reintroduction of Sharia in Kaduna and Kebbi States. While
mobilization against Sharia was reflected in public protests in Kaduna State
(Kaduna) and Kebbi State (Zuru), the outcome of the protests differ, in that
they were peaceful in Zuru, but turned violent in the city of Kaduna. The
Kaduna riots reduced the city and some other parts of the state (such as
Kachia) to rubble, left at least 2,000 persons dead,52 and led to the
displacement of over 63,000 people within Kaduna and its surroundings.53 The

50

Interview with Mallam Attahiru Jega in Birnin Kebbi, Kebbi State (May 2, 2008).
Salwa Ismail, Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 614, 630–
31 (2004).
52 See Violence Erupts in Northern Nigeria, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2001, 2:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/1638282.stm.
53 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., NIGERIA: NO END TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 5
(2009), available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/2AE6C08BF7
379B75C1257673005A715D/$file/Nigeria+-+November+2009.pdf.
51
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Kaduna violence also led to a major restructuring of the city with people
increasingly moving to areas where their religious faith had a majority of
inhabitants so much so that “[b]y 2002, residents were describing particular
areas of Kaduna town as ‘100 per cent Christian’ or ‘100 per cent Muslim.’”54
At the heart of the violence in Kaduna are issues related directly to the planned
implementation of Sharia, but they are also connected to other issues such as
the historical context of violent conflict in the state.
Another difference is that despite the existence of “Sharia-free zones” in
the two states, Sharia was more vigorously implemented in Kebbi State than
Kaduna State. Unlike in Kebbi State, where freedom from application of
Sharia was restricted merely to parts of Zuru (headquarters of Zuru Emirate),
the freedom from Sharia in Kaduna State was greater and it covered the
predominantly Christian areas of Kaduna and the various southern Kaduna
local governments.55 This divergence is also reflected in the legal system.
Under the Kaduna model
the pre-existing Area (local or native) courts have been abolished and
replaced with Sharia and Customary courts designed to apply Islamic
and customary laws to Muslims and non-Muslims, respectively.
These two systems of parochial courts co-exist with the federationwide common law court system, including the magistrate courts and
56
the High Court.

In Kebbi State, on the other hand, the Area Courts and Upper Area Courts
have been abolished and replaced with Sharia Courts and Upper Sharia Courts
as part of a comprehensive agenda of Sharia implementation, and their
jurisdiction is now limited to “all the Muslims in the State and on all those
who, though non-Muslims, opt to subject themselves to the Sharia law.”57 The
common law Magistrate and High Courts would serve the non-Muslims in the
state.
The divergence in the vigor with which Sharia is implemented in the two
states is further reflected in the differential impact of Sharia in instilling

54

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46, at 5.
This sensitivity to the relatively higher level of ethno-religious heterogeneity in Kaduna State was
achieved through “the devolution of limited powers on local government councils to make, as [bylaws],
according to the desires of their more homogeneous local populations, laws that would not be accepted
throughout the state.” Philip Ostien, Ten Good Things About the Implementation of Shari’a in Some States of
Northern Nigeria, 90 SWED. MISSIOLOGICAL THEMES 163, 173 (2002).
56 Suberu, supra note 3, at 553–54.
57 White Paper, supra note 22, at 178.
55
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Islamic values in the Muslim population or society in general. While in Kebbi
State there is what sociologist Bryan Turner calls the “pietization of the
everyday world”58 as a result of Sharia, this was not so in Kaduna State. With
the launching of Sharia in Kebbi State in December 2000, Sharia laws were
used to “stringently establish the boundary for acceptable/moral and
unacceptable/immoral sexual desire, behavior, and identity.”59 The outcome of
these rigid regulations, however, affected both Muslims and Christians in the
state. In this context, “all ‘unholy alliance[s]’ between sexes in public places,
all sexual activities (e.g. adultery, fornication, and homosexuality)[,] are
considered not only sexual deviation, but also revolt against Allah.”60 To avoid
this situation, coeducational, public secondary schools were segregated along
gender lines through the introduction of the shift system, whereby girls attend
schools during the morning session and boys in the afternoon, or vice versa.
Brothels and disco houses were dismantled and the sale of alcohol was also
prohibited.61 To police morality following the introduction of the new Sharia
legislation, the Kebbi State government established a Hisbah Committee in
2001. The committee’s main role is to monitor and ensure observance of
Sharia among the population, report any breaches, and engage in mediation
and conciliation within the society.
In Kaduna State, on the other hand, the role of Sharia in ridding society of
immoral behaviors and in setting acceptable moral codes has proved daunting
as a result of the diversified moral system in place in the state. Under the
modified Sharia system, implementing any form of religious law was explicitly
foreclosed in the mixed parts of Kaduna and other principal towns. In Muslimmajority areas, the eventual application of Sharia laws, such as restriction of
the sales of alcohol, was ceded to the local governments. However, while
immoral behaviors are prohibited in Muslim-dominated areas, the potency of
this prohibition is rendered tenuous by the easy availability of alternative moral
codes (available in areas where some of the “immoral” acts are not prohibited)
from which many Muslims can easily draw. Consequently, Muslims who do

58

Bryan Turner, Introduction: The Price of Piety, 2 CONTEMP. ISLAM 1, 2 (2008).
Eyene Okpanachi, Ethno-religious Identity and Conflict in Northern Nigeria: Understanding the
Dynamics of Sharia in Kaduna and Kebbi States (IFRA-Nigeria, e-Paper No. 7, 2010), available at http://
www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/OKPANACHI_2010.pdf.
60 Id.
61 This is not to suggest that the “sanitation of society” that came with Sharia led to total eradication of
the prohibited behaviors. To be sure, just like in many Sharia-implementing states, federal government
establishments such as military and police barracks became “safe havens” for those who sought to practice
behaviors prohibited by Sharia.
59
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not want to practice the Islamic moral code practice what could be described as
identity-switching to benefit from the “freedom” the other moral code holds. It
is this flexibility that led a Human Rights Watch interviewee to conclude,
“Generally, it is as if there is no Shari’a in Kaduna.” The report explains:
Kaduna is divided into “Shari’a-compliant” and “non-Shari’acompliant” areas; residents of the former, predominantly Muslim
areas, are expected to comply with the requirements of Shari’a,
whereas those of the predominantly non-Muslim or mixed areas are
not. However, residents of Shari’a-compliant areas can simply cross
over into a non-Shari’a compliant area, where they can buy and
consume alcohol and where prostitution is common, then return to
62
the Shari’a areas without any consequences.

Given this background, the fact that “Shari’a in Kaduna exists in one street but
not in another,”63 Muslims will have to “ultimately rely on their consciences to
chastise them rather than the society’s moral strictures.”64 And in any case,
unlike in Kebbi State where there is a Hisbah that is centrally organized and
coordinated by the government’s Department for Religious Affairs, the
Kaduna State government foreclosed the formation of an overarching moral
police such as the Hisbah. Indeed, Governor Makarfi made clear, in the
proposal he announced in 2000 for a compromise version of Sharia in the state
to be implemented in 2001, that “the state government would not condone or
allow any individual or organization to impose or implement any law in the
state. This is the exclusive preserve of the police.”65
Thus, as evidenced above, the role of government in the implementation of
Sharia is more pronounced in Kebbi State than in Kaduna State, where Muslim
civil society organizations play the preponderant role in organizing Islamic
activities. Given the ethno-religious diversity of Kaduna State, which is more
pronounced than that of Kebbi State, the government was careful not to give
the impression that it favored one group above the other. As a result, the role of
government in Sharia was tentative and reduced. For instance, unlike Kebbi
State—where Sharia was formally launched by the State with fanfare—the
coming into effect of Sharia in Kaduna State was done without such
62

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46, at 17.
Id.
64 Interview with an Islamic cleric in Tudun Wada, Kaduna State (Aug. 25, 2008).
65 Nigerian Riot City Proposes Compromise on Islamic Code, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 10, 2000,
available at http://faculty.fullerton.edu/jsantucci/africa_articles.htm. Consequently, Hisbah in Kaduna State is
more organized by the Islamic civil society organizations or religious sects without much government
coordination as is common in Kebbi State.
63
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celebration. Also, while in Kebbi State the government created and funded a
State Department of Religious Affairs specifically for Islamic Matters
(encompassing the Hisbah Committee, Preaching Board, and Zakat and
Sadaqat Board) under the supervision of a Special Adviser for Religious
Affairs or Sharia to the Governor, the Kaduna State government established a
Bureau of Religious Affairs with separate branches for Muslim Matters and
Christian Matters. Each arm of this Bureau is headed by a Permanent Secretary
that coordinates its group’s activities while at the same time working in
collaboration with the other arm in matters of common interests or challenges
such as Muslim-Christian conflict.66 Also, the Kaduna State government
declined to “creat[e] or commit[] funds to some Sharia-related institutions or
programmes” that were instituted in Kebbi State, including the “intensification
of religious programmes like the Sharia Rayuwar Muslimi (Sharia the
prosperity of Muslims); the enlightenment of the general public on issues
relating to the Sharia . . .; the building of mosques,” the payment of allowances
to Islamic clerics, and “the expansion of Arabic and Islamic schools.”67
III. SHARIA COMPROMISE: THE KADUNA MODEL AND THE CHALLENGE OF
PEACE-BUILDING IN A PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY
In Kebbi State, Christian and Muslim civil society groups did not
collaboratively design the framework for peace, but relied more on the
governor’s goodwill and patronage and the adaptive responses by Muslims and
Christians to ease the tensions of religious coexistence. Similarly, in Kaduna
State, the government played a critical role in engendering peace. One aspect
of government involvement was the creation of institutions that recognized a
pluralist version of Sharia law, including the Bureau of Religious Affairs (to
implement religious issues for Muslims and Christians) and a bipartisan
body—the Kaduna Peace Forum—with membership from both the Muslim and
Christian communities. Beyond the pluralist version of Sharia law, the
governor also created independent districts and chiefdoms for the non-Muslim
communities in southern Kaduna and upgraded some of the chiefs representing
these communities to first-class status. Through the process, the governor
eased the resentment (and sometimes violent resistance) of the southern
66

According to interviews conducted in Kaduna State, the two Bureau arms have an early warning signal
of conflict areas. Joint personnel are therefore sent to these conflict zones to settle the differences or nip the
conflict in the bud before it reaches a crisis stage.
67 Okpanachi, supra note 59, at 40; see also PHILIP OSTIEN, SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE
REPORTS AND RELATED WHITE PAPERS 218 (2007), available at http://www.sharia-in-africa.net/pages/
publications/sharia-implementation-in-northern-nigeria.php.
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Kaduna communities that have persistently complained of their subjugation to
emirate rule under the arrangement that previously existed.
However, the ultimate task of peace-building in Kaduna State was
deflected to civil society, which has proven to be a relatively positive force in
generating local capital, trust, and consensus building. A key part of this peacebuilding has been the collaborative effort of civil society groups such as the
Interfaith Mediation Centre (“IMC”) founded by James Wuye, a pastor, and
Muhammad Ashafa, an imam who once led opposing community militias and
suffered personal losses during some of the violent conflicts in the state. The
IMC organizes projects and workshops advocating peace, dialogue, and open
communication in schools and local communities. Some of these interventions
are done in collaboration with international institutes such as the United States
Institute of Peace (“USIP”) or other NGOs, such as the Federation of Muslim
Women Association of Nigeria (“FOMWAN”).
The high point of the activities of the IMC was when twenty-two Islamic
and Christian leaders convened before a crowd of about 25,000 people in
August 2002 to sign a “Peace Declaration” that would “create a platform of
collaboration between religious stakeholders and government to foster greater
understanding between religious adherents and the State.”68 Through the peace
declaration (now known as the Kaduna Peace Declaration (“KPD”)), the
Islamic and Christian leaders pledged to “work with all sections of the
community for a lasting and just peace” based on the injunctions of their
religion; sought to “create an atmosphere where present and future generations
will co-exist with mutual respect and trust in one another”; condemned “all
forms of violence” as well as “incitement and demonization”; and sought to
“aid spiritual regeneration, economic development and inward investment.”69
The religious leaders also announced the establishment of a joint committee
(known as the Kaduna Peace Committee (“KPC”)) “to implement the
recommendations of their declarations and encourage dialogue between the
two faiths.” Modeled on the Alexandria Declaration of January 2002, reputed
to be “the first time[] representatives of all the faith traditions in Israel and
Palestine signed a declaration calling for a religiously sanctioned cease-fire
and an end to both violence and demonization of the ‘other,’”70 the KPD was
68 See Muhammad Ashafa & James Wuye, Warriors and Brothers, in PEACEMAKERS IN ACTION:
PROFILES OF RELIGION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 247, 272 (David Little ed., 2007).
69 Id.
70 Andrew White, Bringing Religious Leaders Together in Israel/Palestine, in RELIGIOUS
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEMAKING: WHEN RELIGION BRINGS PEACE, NOT WAR 9, 10 (2006).
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also signed by Stephen Shekari, the deputy governor, on behalf of Governor
Mohammed Makarfi.71 To demonstrate publicly their agreement to renounce
violence, these leaders unveiled a centrally located plaque displaying their
agreement for all community members to read and celebrate.72
The KPC has not only mediated among the interreligious groups, but has
also collaborated with the state government to foster peace. A specific example
was during the riots that broke out during the Miss World pageant in 2002 over
a southern newspaper columnist’s insinuation that the opposition of
conservative Muslims to the hosting of the event in Nigeria during the Muslim
holy month of Ramadan was misplaced as Prophet Mohammed himself in all
honesty, “would probably have chosen a wife from among [the contestants].”73
While violence did break out in Kaduna leading to the death of about 250
people,74 it has been argued that the violence would have been worse had the
KPC not intervened to calm people and coordinate security movements.75
Another example was the swift reaction by the KPC to mobilize Christian
leaders to denounce the provocative Danish cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammed in 2005, a move that may have helped Kaduna State avoid the
violence and loss of life that occurred in some states where Muslims protested
against the cartoons. Also, given its success in Kaduna State, IMC has been
replicating the Kaduna Peace Model in some parts of the country where there
has been violent communal conflicts, such as Plateau and Bauchi States, and
bringing warring communities in these areas together to converse and create
pragmatic solutions to their conflicts.
The democratic opening since 1999 has allowed the many divisions
between Nigerian Muslims and Christians, such as the debate over Sharia, to
be discussed locally. This decentralization of conflict has provided more
opportunities to defuse incipient conflicts locally before they escalate into
national crises, as poignantly demonstrated especially by the Kaduna example
where the ingenious solutions by the government and civil society played
important roles in managing these local conflicts relatively well. At the same
time, however, the contestations associated with democracy have challenged

71

Interview with James Wuye, Pastor, in Kaduna State (Oct. 12, 2009).
Ashafa & Wuye, supra note 68, at 272.
73 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46, at 7.
74 Id. at 7–9.
75 See Judith Asuni, Security and Conflict Transformation in the Niger Delta (Apr. 2, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/africa/pdf/Asuni-Security-andConflict-Transformation.pdf.
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the local peace initiatives, drawn religion into politics, and widened the
Muslim-Christian rift. This was the case with the April 2011 presidential
elections, which played out with disastrous consequences for Kaduna State
(and some other states in the north), polarizing the civil societies and
weakening their ability to stand above partisanship and to abide by their
commitment to peaceful intergroup harmony. This recent violence
demonstrates that conflicts in Kaduna State are underpinned by political and
socio-economic, not just religious, factors, such as Sharia, and the
intermingling of these complex issues can make the role of civil society in
peace-building difficult.
The recent escalation of violence in Kaduna State that was part of the April
2011 post-election rioting that swept eleven northern states76 is partly a
reflection, but also a consequence, of the power realignment that took place at
the federal level with the death of President Umaru Yar’Adua (a Muslim from
the north) on May 5, 2010, and the ascension to the presidency of Vice
President Goodluck Jonathan (a Christian from the minority ethnic group in the
oil producing Niger delta region).77 With his ascension to the presidency,
Goodluck Jonathan picked Namadi Sambo, a Muslim and Governor of Kaduna
State, to serve as the country’s vice president. This cleared the stage for Patrick
Yakowa, the deputy governor, to step in as the Governor of Kaduna State.
While the Christians, who have strenuously complained of a Muslim scheme to
keep Christians from the governorship of the state since its creation in 1976,
welcomed this “miraculous” turn of events that elevated Yakowa to governor,
and hence the first Christian to occupy the position, some Muslims were not
comfortable with the development. This group of Muslims hoped to revert to
the status quo by voting in the Muslim gubernatorial candidate of the Congress
for Progressive Change (“CPC”) instead of Yakowa, the gubernatorial
candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party (“PDP”) in the April 2011
gubernatorial election. Given this realignment, the PDP was wrongly seen by
many as a Christian party (despite the fact the party controls all the
governorship positions in the north) while the CPC was perceived as a Muslim
party.

76 There was rioting in eleven out of the twelve states that implemented Sharia. Riots did not take place
in Kebbi State, the comparative case in this Essay.
77 See Adam Nossiter, An Accidental Leader Stirs Hopes in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A1
(discussing the circumstances surrounding Jonathan’s accession to the presidency).
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Thus, prior to the elections, there were allegations and counter-allegations
of “intimidation and campaign of calumny”78 by politicians, especially from
the PDP and CPC. Also, religious leaders were alleged to have instructed their
followers to vote for particular persons and parties.79 The governor himself
drew religion into the conflict when he visited Christian religious leaders to
solicit their votes and prayers for his elections,80 a move some Muslims
interpreted to mean that the state governor recognized only Christians in the
state. This action of the governor was countered by a text message sent to
Muslims, allegedly sponsored by a group that calls itself the Nigerian Muslim
League (“NML”), which accused Governor Yakowa of implementing a
Christian agenda and calling on Muslims to vote the governor out of office. In
the text message, the NML argued that “[i]nstead of soliciting for our support,
Yakowa people have distributed countless leaflets, sending [short message
service (“SMS”)] to their members, abusing our religion and exposing his
agenda against us and our religion if elected.”81 The group then urged Muslims
to reject Yakowa at the polls:
Muslims are not divided. Christians have unit (sic) us more. What
(sic) our majority votes, we can change the conspiracy of only
700,000 southern Kaduna votes. We urge Muslims to be peaceful.
We will not split our votes. Muslims should mind such SMS and vote
82
wisely in both elections. Vote Yakowa out.

Before the gubernatorial elections scheduled for April 26, 2011, the
presidential elections were held on April 16, 2011. On April 18, 2011, as
results of the presidential elections started indicating victory for the PDP’s
candidate—Goodluck Jonathan—over his major challenger—CPC’s General
Mohammed Buhari—there were violent demonstrations by supporters of the
CPC over what they perceived as the fraud that characterized the elections.
During the protests, the CPC supporters burned PDP campaign offices as well
as the homes and businesses of local PDP leaders and traditional rulers (most
of whom were of the same Islamic faith as the protestors) who were accused of
colluding to commit electoral fraud. The protests, however, took an ethnic and
78 Segun Olatunju, Polls: PDP, Opposition at Loggerheads over Violence in Kaduna, PUNCH (Nigeria),
Mar. 26, 2011, http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art20110326126531.
79 See Nigeria Imam and Pastor in Kaduna Urge Unity, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-africa-13129572.
80 See Isaiah Benjamin, Nigeria: Yakowa Takes Campaign to Churches, LEADERSHIP (Abuja), Apr. 14,
2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201104140505.html.
81 Segun Olatunji, Anxiety in Kaduna over Inciting SMS, PUNCH (Nigeria), Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.
punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art201104142102750.
82 Id.
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religious turn, attacking Christians and burning churches. This led to reprisal
attacks on Muslims and mosques in the Christian-dominated areas of southern
Kaduna. By the time violence was suppressed by the military and a twentyfour-hour curfew imposed on the state by the government, more than 680
people were reportedly killed (out of a total of 800 victims of the post-election
violence in the eleven northern states),83 several injured, and no fewer than
26,000 displaced persons84 were settled across 100 centers in the state.85 The
situation has led to fears of further separation of the state along ethno-religious
lines, with Muslims and Christians moving to places where they predominate,
as happened during the Sharia crisis. It has also led to a blame game and a
bitter war of words between Christian and Muslim groups, which has further
polarized the state (and the country) along ethnic and religious lines. For
example, the SCSN and the Kaduna Council of Ulamah have described the
situation as the implementation of “planned genocide” against Muslims,
facilitated and worsened by the governor’s neglect and delay extending the
curfew declared in Kaduna metropolis and sending security agents to the
warring areas in southern Kaduna where Muslims were killed and “in some
places not even a single soul or child was spared.”86 For their part, CAN in
northern states and the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (“SOKAPU”)
described the violence as premeditated and planned attacks87 by the HausaFulani Muslims of Kaduna State who think it is their birthright to rule the nonMuslim population of southern Kaduna.88
The post-election violence therefore shattered the relative peace that
Kaduna had hitherto enjoyed since the Miss World riots in 2002. Yet, given the
degree of mutual antagonism between the Christian ethnic groups of southern
83 See Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 16, 2011), http://www.
hrw.org/en/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800.
84 According to relief agencies, 65,000 people have been displaced in the post-election violence in the
affected states in the north. Ikechukwu Amaechi, In Defence of Muhammadu Buhari (1), IYKE (May 24, 2011),
http://ikechukwu.wordpress.com/2011/07/16/in-defence-of-muhammadu-buhari-1.
85 See Scott Stearns, Nigerian Human Rights Group: At Least 500 Killed in Post-Election Violence,
VOICE AM. (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Nigerian-Human-Rights-Group-AtLeast-500-Killed-in-Post-Election-Violence-120579459.html.
86 See Segun Olatunji, Muslim Leaders Blame Yakowa for Violence, PUNCH (Nigeria), Apr. 27, 2011,
http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art201104276563578.
87 See Blessing Olaifa, CAN Wants Post-election Violence Perpetrators Punished, BUSINESS DAY
(May 3, 2011), http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/111-politics/20821-can-wants-postelection-violence-perpetrators-punished.
88 See Tonye Akowe, Southern Kaduna Residents Advocate National Conference, Military Base, NATION
(Lagos State) (May 19, 2011), http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news-update/6727-southernkaduna-residents-advocate-national-conference-military-base.html.
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Kaduna and the major supporters of the governor’s election and Hausa-Fulani
Muslims and main supporters of the CPC candidate that existed before the
election, it was not surprising that the violence occurred when it did. But the
explanation for the violence, just like the Sharia violence of 2000 in the state,
can be found not just in the issue of religious and ethnic identity, but also the
patterns of exclusion and inclusion associated with these identities, the
manipulation of these identities by politicians and civil society organizations in
political contestations, the failure by government to manage more effectively
the contests for political power, and the high returns on political power that has
transformed electoral and political competition into “low Intensity Armed
Struggle.”89 The escalation of violence is also explained by state
irresponsibility, reflected in the inability of the security apparatus in Nigeria to
guarantee law and order in society, the high number of unemployed and
frustrated youths, and the high poverty level in the country that, as the
Secretary General of Nigeria’s Catholic Secretariat put it, “has assumed the
moral character of war.”90 These challenges have made civil society’s peacebuilding task daunting in Kaduna State and elsewhere in the country.
CONCLUSION
This Essay demonstrates that, on its own, the Sharia issue has potential for
provoking bitter intergroup relations and conflict, as it did in Kaduna and
Kebbi States; however, the key to better understanding the controversy, its
transformation to violence, and its impact on peace mediation efforts is found
in the interaction of the Sharia issue with the historical dynamics; ethnoreligious configuration and its impact on identity mobilization; the character
and role of political and religious leaders; nature of governance; complexion of
civil society; degree of religious politicization; and different states’ local
politics regarding access to the state and its resources. These issues account for
why, despite some similarities, there are also remarkable differences in the
processes and outcomes of Sharia law in Kaduna and Kebbi States. Thus,
while in Kebbi State, which is predominantly Muslim, Sharia implementation
and non-Muslims’ protests against it passed largely peacefully, the story was
different in Kaduna State, a state with an almost balanced demography

89 ENVTL. RIGHTS ACTION, ELECTION MONITORING REPORT ON THE ONGOING NIGERIA FEDERAL AND
STATE GENERAL ELECTIONS, APRIL/MAY 2003 (2003), available at http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/
earticles/election_as_a_low_intensity_arme.htm.
90 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THEY DO NOT OWN THIS PLACE”: GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
“NON-INDIGENES” IN NIGERIA 2 (2006).
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between Christians and Muslims. Here, the remarkable efforts by the state’s
political leadership as well as civil society to peacefully mediate and manage
interreligious and inter-ethnic conflict over the Sharia have been hobbled at
times as a result of the state’s complex web of politically salient identities and
history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, which has
earned for it the designation of the “Lebanon” or “East Timor” of Nigeria.91
Furthermore, partly due to its history as a relatively advanced, urban
conglomeration accommodating various groups and institutions, when
compared to other states in the north, and partly as a result of its recent history
as a state known for violent ethno-religious antagonism, Kaduna State has a
diversified (pluralized) civil society that has been the site for construction of
normative consensus for peace-building. At the same time, however, these
same dynamics have led to a highly radicalized and politicized civil society
that engages political contestations with exclusivity that has inflamed the
fissures of the state’s plural society and unraveled the success of the peace
mediation efforts. These factors could also account for why Kuduna State,
which implemented a partial version of Sharia, was engulfed in violent conflict
in light of the 2011 elections, while Kebbi State, which applied a more
stringent version of Sharia, did not.

91 Suberu, supra note 17, at 337 (citing Ezra Yakusak, Southern Kaduna: Nigeria’s East Timor,
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 20, 1999, at 53).

